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INTRODUCTION 
 
 “I know he’s the most hated man in America,” said one of 
the prospective jurors in the securities fraud trial of Martin Skhreli 
– the notorious “Pharma Bro” who raised the price of a generic, life-
saving drug from $13.50 to $750 per pill.1 According to Zoe Thomas 
and Tim Swift at BBC News, “He’s been called a ‘morally bankrupt 
sociopath’, a ‘scumbag’ a ‘garbage monster’ and everything that is 
wrong with capitalism.’”2 To the public, Skhreli was the 
personification of rampant greed gone wrong; however, he was not 
alone in raising prices to unconscionable levels for life-saving drugs 
and other necessary medications. Around the same time that 
Skhreli’s company, Turing Pharmaceuticals LLC (“Turing”), was 
increasing prices, other companies, such as Valeant Pharmaceuticals 
International, Inc. (“Valeant”), Retrophin Inc. (“Retrophin”), and 
Rodelis Therapeutics (“Rodelis”) also increased prices on generic 
                                                        
1 Renae Merle, Pharma Bro Trial Hits Speed Bump, Finding Jurors Who 
Don’t Already Dislike Him, WASH. POST (June 28, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/06/27/pharma-
bro-martin-skhreli-goes-on-trial-where-he-finds-another-kind-of-
limelight/?utm_term=.ab4ad3364076. 
2 Zoe Thomas & Tim Swift, Who is Martin Shkreli- “The Most Hated 
Man in America,” BBC NEWS (Aug. 4, 2017), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34331761. 
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drugs to exorbitant levels.3 While Skhreli drew the bulk of media 
attention through his ostentatious behavior,4 the Government 
Accountability Office conducted a study that found that out of a 
basket of 1,441 established generic drugs, more than 300 had at least 
one extraordinary price increase of 100 percent or more from the 
beginning of 2010 to the beginning of 2015.5   
 These recent forays of pharmaceutical companies into 
charging whatever-the-market-will-bear for previously inexpensive 
treatments have made “price gouging” a key term in discussions on 
rising health care costs. Pursuant to such discussions, state 
legislators are working to pass laws that prevent pharmaceutical 
companies from charging excessive prices for their drugs.6 In 
addition to the state of Maryland passing a generic drug price-
gouging law in 2017, the states of Massachusetts, New York, Rhode 
Island, and Tennessee are also considering price gouging legislation 
to reign in pharmaceutical costs.7 These laws attempt to remedy the 
situation by putting a cap on drug price increases and/or requiring 
greater pricing transparency in the pharmaceutical market. 
 This note acknowledges that the high cost of drugs, both 
generic and patented, is an important issue for patients and policy 
makers alike. This note focuses solely on generic drugs, as the rights 
of drug patent holders are protected by the Copyright Clause of the 
United States Constitution,8 which this note does not seek to 
address. Additionally, although the cost of drugs can be heavily 
impacted by Congress and federal regulatory agencies such as the 
Department of Health and Human Services and the Food and Drug 
Administration, this note will only look at the measures being taken 
by legislatures at the state level. 
                                                        
3 Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes from $13.50 a tablet to $750, Overnight, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-
increase-in-a-drugs-price-raises-protests.html?mcubz=0. 
4 Emily Jane Fox, Pharma Bro Martin Shkreli Is Even More Terrible 
Than You Thought, VANITY FAIR (Feb. 19, 2016), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/02/pharma-bro-martin-shkreli-
threat. 
5 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-16-706, Generic Drugs Under 
Medicare: Part D Generic Drug Prices Declined Overall, but Some Had 
Extraordinary Price Increases (Aug. 2016), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679022.pdf [hereinafter GAO Report]. 
6 To Dent Soaring Drug Costs, States Turn to ‘Price-Gouging’ Laws, 
MANAGED CARE MAG. (Sept. 6, 2017), 
https://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2017/9/dent-soaring-drug-
costs-states-turn-price-gouging-laws. 
7 Id. 
8 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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 Part I of this note will explain how generic drugs are brought 
to market, how manufacturers were able to charge so much for these 
generic or off-patent drugs without challenges from competitors, as 
well as what the consequences of price spikes are for patients, 
hospitals and insurers. Part I will also delve into the history of price 
gouging laws and examine the results from past economic 
regulations. Part II of this note will analyze the benefits and 
drawbacks of the relevant state laws and legislation regulating 
generic drug price increases. Part III of this note argues that state 
laws that cap prices on generic drugs should not be enacted, as they 
may result in shortages of necessary drugs; however, laws requiring 
greater transparency for drug price increases should be enacted to 
allow patients and providers the opportunity to find alternatives and 
to signal competitors that there may be an opportunity to enter the 
market. 
 
I. BACKGROUND ON GENERIC DRUGS AND THE 
HISTORY OF PRICE GOUGING LAWS 
 
A. Price Spikes in the Generic Market 
 
 Analyzing new laws regarding the generic drug market 
requires an understanding of the Hatch-Waxman Act (“Act”), which 
created the modern generic drug industry.9 The Act was intended “to 
balance two conflicting policy objectives: to induce name-brand 
pharmaceutical firms to make the investments necessary to research 
and develop new drug products, while simultaneously enabling 
competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of those drugs to 
market.”10 Prior to the Act, when a manufacturer wished to produce 
a drug for which patent protection had expired, the manufacturer 
was required to conduct expensive and lengthy premarket clinical 
trials of the drug to prove its safety and efficacy.11 This costly 
process reduced the incentive for manufacturers to enter the generic 
drug market, which resulted in less competition and higher prices 
for prescription drugs.12  
 To ensure a competitive market that would lower prices, the 
Act established an expedited system for generic drug approval.13 
                                                        
9 See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 
30: Do We Need A Re-Designed Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 293 (2015). 
10 Abbot Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990)(Edwards, 
J., dissenting). 
11 Kesselheim, supra note 9, at 297. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 301. 
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Rather than conduct clinical trials, the generic drug manufacturer 
only had to show that the active ingredients in the new generic drug 
were the same as the original listed drug, that the “route of 
administration, the dosage form, and the strength of the new drug 
[were] the same as those of the listed drug, and that the generic drug 
[was] absorbed by the body at the same rate as the listed drug 
(bioequivalent).”14 Because it was easier for manufacturers to enter 
the market, robust competition in the generic pharmaceutical 
industry ensued. The new process under the Act resulted in decades 
of relief from rising prescription drug costs.15 On average, generic 
drugs cost 80 percent less than brand-name drugs.16 How then was 
Skhreli and his ilk able to raise their prices on generic and off-
patent17 drugs as if they had a monopoly? 
 Following a spate of high profile drug price spikes, the 
bipartisan Senate Special Committee on Aging began an 
investigation into abrupt and dramatic price increases in prescription 
drugs whose patents had expired.18 Turing, Valeant, Retrophin, and 
Rodelis were the focus of the investigation and the committee 
uncovered a business model used by these companies to exploit 
market failures. The business model consists of five key elements: 
(1) acquire a sole-source drug, with only one manufacturer and no 
immediate competition; (2) ensure the drug was the gold standard—
the best drug for the condition it treats; (3) select a drug serving a 
                                                        
14 Id. at 301-02 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii)). 
15 Understanding Recent Trends in Generic Drug Prices, U.S. Dep’t of 
Health and Human Servs., (Jan. 27, 2016), available at 
https://aspe.hhs.gov/pdf-report/understanding-recent-trends-generic-
drug-prices. 
16 Senate Special Committee on Aging, Sudden Price Spikes in Off-
Patent Prescription Drugs: The Monopoly Business Model that Harms 
Patients, Taxpayers, and the U.S. Healthcare System (2016) [hereinafter 
“Sudden Price Spikes”], available at 
https://www.congress.gov/114/crpt/srpt429/CRPT-114srpt429.pdf. 
17 For purposes of this note “off-patent” refers to a drug that is not under 
patent protection and “generic” refers to one that is the biological 
equivalent of another drug. See generally Generic Drug Development, 
FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsarede
velopedandapproved/approvalapplications/abbreviatednewdrugapplicatio
nandagenerics/ucm142112.htm (last updated July 19, 2018). 
18 See, e.g., Press Release, Collins, McCaskill Open Senate Investigation 
into Rx Drug Pricing, Announce Intention to Hold Hearings, Senate 
Special Committee on Aging, (Nov. 4, 2015), 
https://www.aging.senate.gov/press-releases/collins-mccaskill-open-
senate-investigation-into-rx-drug-pricing-announce-intention-to-hold-
hearings.  
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small market which would be unattractive to competitors and which 
was too small to mount an organized opposition; (4) control access 
to the drug through a closed distribution system where a drug could 
not be obtained through normal channels, thus depriving 
competitors access to samples of the drug for bioequivalency tests; 
and (5) price gouge by charging as much as possible.19 
 The drug that Turing acquired, Daraprim, is used to treat a 
rare tropical parasite, toxoplasmosis, that typically is only dangerous 
in HIV/AIDS and cancer patients due to their weakened immune 
system.20 Daraprim is an off-patent drug for which patent protection 
had expired decades ago; however, at the time, there were no other 
manufacturers producing it.21 This made Daraprim a sole-source 
drug.  
 Turing believed that Daraprim was considered by physicians 
to be the gold standard of drugs for treating toxoplasmosis, and that 
doctors would go out of their way to make sure patients had access 
to the drug because it was the best available treatment.22 There was 
a substandard alternative to Daraprim used by a small subset of 
physicians, but it did not diminish Daraprims’s value as the gold 
standard.23  
 Daraprim was also a small market drug; it only sold 9,708 
units (bottles) in 2014 with net sales under $5 million.24 Turing had 
analyzed the market and found that just 10.8 percent of off-patent 
drugs with under $10 million in annual sales faced generic 
competition within three years.25 Turing found that a significant 
amount of effort and resources was required to serve small patient 
populations, and that manufacturers were not likely to compete in 
those markets.26 Additionally, Turing also believed that the number 
of Daraprim patients was “too small to stimulate a significant 
lobbying effort were the cost of therapy to become an issue.”27 If the 
price were to rise drastically, Turing counted on the relatively 
insignificant population to be ignored. 
 Turing not only purchased a sole-source drug, but also 
attempted to protect its de facto monopoly status by restricting its 
                                                        
19 Sudden Price Spikes, supra note 16, at 4. 
20 Naren P. Tallapragada, Off-Patent Drugs at Brand-Name Prices: A 
Puzzle for Policymakers, J. LAW BIOSCI. 3 (1): 238-47 (2016). 
21 Id. 
22 Sudden Price Spikes, supra note 16, at 34. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 36. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. (Turing’s internal documents). 
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distribution.28 Under “closed distribution,” the drug cannot be 
obtained through normal pharmacy channels, but instead had to be 
obtained from “specialty” pharmacies.29 This means that Turing 
could control the distribution of its product to prevent other generic 
drug manufacturers from getting their hands on Daraprim.30 For a 
drug manufacturer to get a generic alternative approved by the FDA, 
the manufacturer must perform bioequivalency tests, and the 
manufacturer is required to have a supply of the original drug.31 By 
closing distribution, Turing was able to keep Daraprim out of the 
hands of any generic manufacturers who would try to manufacture 
a lower priced alternative. Lastly, the goal of this business plan is to 
charge monopoly prices, and Turing completed the final phase of its 
business plan by raising the price of Daraprim 5,000 percent 
overnight.32  
 Drug price spikes have a terrible effect on patients gaining 
access to the treatment they need. These price increases also 
interfere with physicians and hospitals providing care to their 
communities. Furthermore, price increases also elevate the costs of 
private insurance and government programs, which have a broader 
impact on all consumers. 
 Sudden price hikes can create a financial crisis that 
compounds a patient’s health issues. The Senate Committee on 
Aging found that following price spikes, some patients were forced 
to go without vital medicine, skip doses, or hoard pills out of fear 
that their next refill would not be affordable.33 Patients who were 
able to maintain coverage for their medication through insurance 
worried that they could lose access without warning if the drugs 
were dropped from their insurance plan’s formulary, and patients 
getting their medication through Patient Assistance Programs34 
worried that their application for assistance could be denied at any 
point.35  
 Following Turing’s price increase of Daraprim, from $1,350 
to $75,000 for a bottle of 100 pills, patients experienced treatment 
interruptions or went without treatment entirely, and some insurance 
                                                        
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 37. 
31 Id. at 31 
32 Pollack, supra note 3. 
33 Sudden Price Spikes supra note 16 at 98. 
34 Patient Assistance Programs help patients who cannot afford the drugs 
they need. See, e.g., Merck’s Patient Assistance Program, Merck Helps 
(last visited on May 23, 2018), https://www.merckhelps.com.  
35 Sudden Price Spikes, supra note 16, at 98. 
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companies made it more difficult for their beneficiaries to get 
Daraprim.36 
When Valeant raised prices on two of its drugs used to treat Wilson 
disease,37 patients who had been successfully managing their 
disease with those drugs for most of their lives were suddenly at risk 
of losing treatment.38 While some patients managed to get assistance 
in order to obtain the medication they needed, many had to go 
without medication for some time, thus increasing the risk to their 
health, while others switched to medications that posed additional 
risks, side effects and lifestyle restrictions.39  
 Price spikes can also affect patients by placing undue 
burdens on physicians, hospitals and insurers. Valeant had increased 
the prices of two drugs that were primarily used by hospitals for 
emergency care: one by 720 percent and the other by 310 percent.40 
The Committee found that the extra costs put a strain on hospital 
budgets, and in attempting to lower costs, physicians lost time with 
patients, which contributed to hospital inefficiency because they had 
to expend effort searching for substitute drugs and developing new 
treatment protocols.41 Additionally, hospitals began rationing these 
drugs and did not stock them on every crash cart in the hospital, 
which increased the time it took for a patient to receive the drugs in 
an emergency.42 The Committee also heard testimony that the 
increased drug prices would cause hospitals to cut back on services 
to the broader community.43  
 Rising drug prices also affect private insurance companies 
by increasing costs, which are then passed on to the consumer in the 
                                                        
36 Id. at 102. 
37 Wilson’s disease can be fatal if left untreated, serious complications 
include scarring of the liver, liver failure, persistent neurological 
problems, kidney problems, psychological problems, and blood 
problems. Wilson’s Disease, Mayo Clinic (March 7, 2018), 
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/wilsons-
disease/symptoms-causes/syc-20353251.  
38 Sudden Price Spikes supra note 16 at 99. 
39 Id. citing Qato, Dima M, et al., Changes in Prescription and Over-the-
Counter Medication and Dietary Supplement Use Among Older Adults in 
the United States, 2005 vs 2011, 176 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 473, 473 (Apr. 
2016).    
40 Sudden Price Spikes supra note 16 at 64. 
41 Id. at 105. 
42 Id. 
43 Sudden Price Spikes supra note 16 at 105 (explaining that initiatives to 
connect low-income and vulnerable communities with health care 
services, food, transportation and housing, as well as initiatives to stem 
the opioid crises would be at risk of being cut because of price hikes).   
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form of higher premiums and/or a lower percentage of coverage.44 
A patient with insurance coverage may not notice the immediate 
effect of a price spike (unless they have a high deductible to meet 
and are billed for the prescription); however, the patient will still 
feel the effect in the form of across-the-board increases in premium 
costs, deductibles and consumer cost share.45 
 Federal government programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, 
Veterans Affairs and the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
spend around $126 billion on prescription drugs.46 Drug price spikes 
contribute to higher government expenditures, which are ultimately 
borne by American taxpayers. 
 In 2016, Medicare asked the Government Accountability 
Office (“GAO”) to study trends in generic drug pricing.47 The GAO 
interviewed manufacturers, pharmacy associations, plan sponsors 
and their Pharmacy Benefit Managers (“PBM”) – almost all of 
which indicated that competition, influenced by various factors, 
impacts the price of generic drugs.48 The manufacturers explained 
that the generic drug market operates like a commodities market – 
the manufacturers submit their offer to their customers (pharmacies 
or wholesalers), and if another manufacturer offers a lower price to 
a customer, then the competing offeror is asked to match the price 
or risk losing market to the other manufacturer.49 When a 
manufacturer brings a generic drug into an established market, it 
typically offers a lower price than that of the current market in order 
to build its customer base.50 The price falls as each new 
                                                        
44 Skinner, Ginger, Why Drug Costs Keep Rising—and What You Can Do 
About It. CONSUMER REPORTS (May 16, 2017), available at 
https://www.consumerreports.org/drug-prices/why-drug-costs-keep-
rising-what-you-can-do-about-it/ (explaining that insurance companies 
may also reduce coverage for certain drugs during the year or drop them 
entirely from their formulary). 
45 Is There a Cure for High Drug Prices?, CONSUMER REPORTS,  
https://www.consumerreports.org/drugs/cure-for-high-drug-prices/(last 
updated July 29, 2016), 
46 Sudden Price Spikes supra note 16 (citing CMS, Prescription Drug 
Expenditures, National Health Expenditures by Type of Service and 
Source of Funds, CY 1960-2015, at lines 287,289,292,294,295,299,302, 
and 308, which totals to $126.246 billion, 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-
Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.h
tml). 
47 GAO Report supra note 5. 
48 Id. at 23. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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manufacturer enters the market, with one manufacturer noting that 
each entrant typically results in a twenty-percent decline in price.51 
The price stays low until manufacturers begin exiting the market.52 
As such, it follows that prices should fall if manufacturers decide 
later on to re-enter the market. 
 While generic drugs contribute to lower overall drug prices, 
the GAO found that the rate at which generic drugs contribute to 
lower prices is declining.53 The GAO also found that the decline in 
generic drug prices has been significantly slowed by price hikes.54 
Out of a basket of 1,441 generic drugs, the GAO found that 315 
drugs experienced an extraordinary price increase (categorized as 
one-hundred percent or more) from 2010 to 2015.55 These drugs 
increased the average price of the GAO’s established drug basket by 
twenty-five percentage points. Specifically, the average price of the 
1,441 drugs fell by fourteen percent – when calculated without those 
315 drugs, the average price fell by thirty-nine percent.56 
Furthermore, the GAO also found that the price increases lasted for 
longer than a year and most did not go down in price after the 
increase.57 Price spikes are an emerging trend in the generic drug 
market and have considerably slowed the downward movement in 
generic drug prices. While Martin Skhreli managed to exploit a sole-
sourced drug for monopoly level price hikes, extraordinary price 
increases have been occurring with greater frequency throughout the 
generic drug market. These price hikes place patients’ overall health 
and well-being at risk while simultaneously increasing insurance 
costs and costs of government programs.  
 
B. Price Gouging Laws 
 
 Governments have a long history of using price controls to 
assuage popular enmity against rising prices.58 Price controls have 
been an issue dating as far back as the Second Century A.D., when 
the Roman Empire was challenged by rapid price increases in 
                                                        
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 See Id. at 16. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 17. 
58 See generally Hugh Rockoff, Drastic Measures: A History of Wage 
and Price Controls in the United States, (Cambridge University Press 
1984); see also Income Policies In the United States: Historical Review 
and Some Issues, Congressional Budget Office (1977), available at 
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/20636?index=10150.  
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commodities.59 At the time, emperor Diocletian had recently split 
the empire into four ruling parts, which had the effect of raising 
taxes across the land. Additionally, emperor Diocletian had also 
debased the currency, which resulted in a rapid upwards movement 
in pricing.60 Diocletian blamed the price increases on greed, and he 
intended to rectify the problem through government intervention, 
stating: 
 
But since it is the sole desire of untamed fury to feel 
no love for the ties of our common humanity . . . it 
suits us, who are the watchful parents of the whole 
human race, that justice step in as an arbiter in the 
case, in order that the long-hoped-for result, which 
humanity could not achieve by itself, may, by the 
remedies which our fore-thought suggests, be 
contributed toward the general alleviation of all.61 
 
To combat high prices, Diocletian issued his Edict fixing 
maximum prices for thousands of consumer items.62 Stiff penalties 
were imposed on any merchant selling wares for more than the 
mandated maximum price.63 This resulted in a drastic shortage of 
goods as merchants hoarded their wares, awaiting a better time to 
sell.64 Prices went even higher, and any trading that happened 
occurred on the black market.65 Despite the good intentions behind 
the Edict, Diocletian’s price fixing solution had resulted in even 
higher prices, and four years after the Edict, Diocletian abdicated his 
power and the law was rescinded.66 
 A more recent example of a price control legislation is 
Hawaii’s gas cap law. In 2002, Hawaii became the first state to pass 
                                                        
59 Id. at 35. 
60 Id. at 37-38; see also Hans Kirchberger, An Ancient Experience With 
Price Control, J. OF FARM ECON., Vol. 24, No. 3 621-636 (Aug. 1942) 
(explaining that farmers let land go untilled because high taxes made it 
unprofitable to work the land, and subsequently because food was in 
shorter supply, prices went up. As a means of getting more money into 
circulation to help with the price increases, rather than cutting taxes on 
farmers, Diocletian replaced silver coins for copper, essentially debasing 
the currency, which resulted in rapid price hikes which were met with 
price controls.) 
61 Roland G. Kent, The Edict of Diocletian Fixing Maximum Prices, 69 
U. PA. L. REV. 35, 41-42 (1921) 
62 Id. at 39. 
63 Id. at 40. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id.  
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legislation with the main objective of establishing a maximum 
wholesale gasoline price cap.67 At the time, Hawaii’s gasoline 
market had not only posted the highest prices in the country for the 
past five years, but also maintained an “upwardly sticky” trend 
which did not fluctuate downward with the rest of the country.68 The 
legislature perceived that there was a lack of competition at the 
wholesale level, and responded by enacting a law to cap prices for 
gasoline sold from the refinery.69 The price was capped at the 
average regular unleaded gasoline price of three interstate markets.70 
After the wholesale cap went into effect, prices at the pump 
promptly went up, with some experts opining that prices would have 
gone higher without the price cap, and detractors saying that it 
increased prices because it allowed gas companies to charge up to 
the maximum allowed.71 The law was suspended by the state’s 
governor eight months after it went into effect.72  
 A few years after the suspension, studies indicated that the 
price for fuel was trading at more than what the capped price would 
have pegged it at.73 An argument in favor of the price caps was that 
oil costs were on an upward trajectory when the caps were 
implemented, so even though it did not appear that the caps were 
working to the Hawaiians, prices were still held in check relative to 
where they would have risen.74  
 Many price gouging laws were enacted by state legislatures 
because of complaints from the public about price hikes for essential 
goods following a disaster.75 Following the terrorist attacks of 
                                                        
67 See Brandon H. Ito, Price Controls in Paradise: Foreshadowing the 
Legal and Economic Consequences of Hawai’i’s Gasoline Price Cap 
Law, 27 U. HAW. L. REV. 549 (2005). 
68 Id. at 550 (explaining that prices would go up when the mainland price 
goes up, but prices would not go down when the mainland price went 
down, taking into account transportation costs of the oil to Hawaii and its 
surrounding islands). 
69 Id. at 551. 
70 Id. 
71 Mark Niesse, Hawaii Gas Cap Running on Fumes, WASH. POST (May 
6, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/05/05/AR2006050501294.html. 
72 Id. 
73 Greg Wiles, Hawaii Gas Above ‘Cap’ Level of Suspended Law, 
HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Jan. 27 2010, 
http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2010/Jan/27/ln/hawaii1270349.
html. 
74 Id. 
75 Geoffrey C. Rapp, Gouging: Terrorist Attacks, Hurricanes, and the 
Legal and Economic Aspects of Post-Disaster Price Regulation, 94 KY. 
L.J. 535, 542 (2006). 
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September 11, 2001, some businesses in Tennessee engaged in price 
gouging, which spurred the legislature to enact a law to protect 
consumers when a “declared state of emergency results in abnormal 
disruptions of the market.”76 Tennessee’s law also states that 
“protecting the public from price gouging is a vital function of state 
government in providing for the health, safety, and welfare of 
consumers.”77 California also has a  price gouging statute, which 
was enacted to protect consumers following a natural or man-made 
disaster.78 More than half of all states in the U.S. have some form of 
price gouging law on the books.79 These laws typically follow one 
of three models in instituting price caps:  
 
1) Percentage Price Caps that bar price hikes from 
exceeding a percentage increase from the pre-
emergency level.  
2) Unconscionability laws that focus on gross 
disparities between the offered price and the price 
prior to the emergency.  
3) No Increase laws that bar any price increases beyond 
costs associated with the disaster.80 
 
 Although prohibitions on excessive price increases 
following a disaster are supported by most people, economists claim 
that they “discourage extraordinary supply efforts that would help 
bring goods in high demand into the affected area.”81 A prevailing 
argument against price controls is that price caps reduce the supply 
of the product being regulated.82 In a market, prices are set by two 
                                                        
76 Tenn. Code. Ann. § 47-18-5101 (2002). 
77 Id. 
78 Ca. Penal Code § 396.  
79 Emily Bae, Are Anti-Price Gouging Legislations Effective Against 
Sellers During Disasters, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 79, 83 (2009). 
80 Id. 
81 Andrew Sorkin, Hurricane Price Gouging is Despicable, Right? Not to 
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factors: (1) the buyer’s demand and (2) the seller’s supply. The more 
the buyer demands the product, the more the seller can charge.83 
Economists argue that in a free market, high prices are inevitable 
until demand subsides or supply expands.84 High prices are an 
important element in getting necessary resources where they are 
most needed, but an artificial cap on prices will result in a shortage 
of supply, thus leaving people without the commodities they need.85 
Price hikes following a disaster signal scarcity, which puts 
consumers on notice to be more judicious in their use of resources, 
and those prices signal to potential producers that there is room to 
enter the market.86 If prices are kept artificially low then consumers 
will not conserve scarce resources and producers will not increase 
supplies, which would result in shortages of necessary goods.87 
Although public sentiment may demand a political solution to the 
problem of price hikes, oftentimes price controls result in shortages. 
 
II. STATE LAWS REGULATING DRUG PRICES 
 
 In the last year, many states have introduced legislation with 
the purpose of countering prescription drug price hikes.88 Such 
legislation typically attempts to regulate prices by either placing a 
cap on drug price increases, or by requiring detailed reporting and 
advance notice of large price increases to relevant state agencies.89 
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On October 1, 2017, Maryland became the first state in the country 
to enact a generic drug price gouging law.90 The first-of-its-kind law 
has both a price gouging prohibition and a notice requirement. First, 
it prohibits manufacturers of essential off-patent or generic drugs 
from engaging in price gouging.91 Second, it allows the Maryland 
Medical Assistance Program (“MMAP”)92 to notify the Attorney 
General of any increase in the price of any essential off-patent or 
generic drug.93 
 Under the first provision, an off-patent or generic drug 
means any prescription drug for which exclusive marketing rights 
have expired.94 A drug that is “essential” is defined as one that has 
either appeared on the Model List of Essential Medicines adopted 
by the World Health Organization,95 or that has been designated as 
essential by the Secretary because of its effectiveness in treating life-
threatening or debilitating chronic health conditions.96 Maryland’s 
law defines price gouging as “an unconscionable increase in the 
price of a prescription drug.”97 An “unconscionable increase” is an 
“excessive” increase which is not justified by the cost of producing 
or marketing the drug, and the consumer has no meaningful choice 
about purchasing the drug, either because they need it for their 
health or because there is not enough competition in the market.98  
 Under the notice provision, MMAP may notify the Attorney 
General if the price increases 50% or more in the wholesale 
acquisition or in the price paid by MMAP for the drug within the 
preceding one year period.99 The Attorney General may request 
from the drug manufacturer a statement that itemizes the 
components of the cost of producing the drug and identifies the 
circumstances and timing of any expenditures made by the 
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manufacturer to market the drug.100 A manufacturer may be required 
to produce any relevant records or other documents.101  
 After Maryland’s generic drug price gouging bill was passed 
into law, the Association for Accessible Medicine (“AAM”) brought 
an action challenging the constitutionality of the new law.102 AAM 
is a non-profit, voluntary association representing a number of 
manufacturers and distributors of generic and biosimilar 
medicines.103 AAM alleged that Maryland’s law violates the 
dormant Commerce Clause because it “regulates conduct occurring 
wholly outside the state, because its members are manufacturers and 
wholesalers of generic drugs who almost all reside outside of 
Maryland, operate under national contracts, and do not sell directly 
to actors in Maryland.”104 AAM also alleged that Maryland’s law is 
impermissibly vague under the Due Process Clause of the 14th 
amendment because “the definition of ‘unconscionable’ increase’ is 
keyed on ‘expansive adjectives,’ including ‘excessive,’ ‘justified,’ 
‘appropriate,’ and ‘meaningful.’”105 On the Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss, the district court dismissed the first cause of action under 
the dormant Commerce Clause,106 but did not dismiss AAM’s claim 
under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.107 AAM 
then appealed, and the Fourth Circuit held that Maryland’s statute 
was unconstitutional because it violated the dormant commerce 
clause.108 The Court emphasized that it was not prohibiting 
Maryland from regulating price gouging, only that Maryland could 
not do so “in the manner utilized by the Act.”109 Maryland may 
                                                        
100 § 2-803(b). 
101 § 2-803(c). 
102 Ass'n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 U.S. 
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“excessive” requires a benchmark to measure from, which is not clearly 
stated in the law). 
108 Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 674 (4th Cir. 
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the dormant commerce clause). 
109 Id. (finding that the Act regulated transactions that took place outside 
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petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, or it may simply 
redraft the law to only regulate in-state transactions, as the Court 
seems to be suggesting.110 Regardless of how Maryland goes 
forward, one of the main criticisms is that price gouging laws will 
have the unintended consequence of affecting the availability of 
essential generic drugs in Maryland.111 If Maryland enacts a law 
which becomes too burdensome on pharmaceutical companies, they 
may simply exit the market, which would force residents to acquire 
their drugs from outside the state. 
 On October 9, 2017, California passed a law requiring drug 
companies to provide advance notice of drug price increases.112 The 
law requires manufacturers to notify purchasers in writing and at 
least sixty days prior to an increase of over sixteen percent of a 
prescription drug’s price.113 Manufacturers must also report 
information about drug price increases quarterly to the Office of 
Statewide Health Planning and Development.114 The report requires 
virtually all financial information related to the cost of the drug, the 
history of the drug’s acquisition, and whether any changes have 
been made to the drug.115 This information will be published within 
sixty days of receipt from a manufacturer on a per drug basis to 
ensure identification.116 This law creates much greater transparency 
for drug price increases and puts all interested parties, including 
competitors, on notice that prices are rising.  
 Shortly after being enacted, California’s law was challenged 
by the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
(“PhRMA”) as being unconstitutional as a violation of: (1) the 
Commerce Clause, because it directly restricts the drug list price 
used nationwide; (2) the First Amendment, because the mandatory 
reporting requirement constitutes compelled speech; and (3) the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, because the language 
of the statute does not address notice requirements for price 
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113 Id. at 127677. 
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increases that occur within sixty days of the enactment of the law.117 
In addition to the constitutional arguments, criticisms of California’s 
law are that the advance notice requirement diminishes competition 
by creating informal price arrangements between manufacturers,118 
and that the law would create shortages by encouraging wholesalers 
and distributors to stockpile drugs in the sixty days prior to the 
increase so that they may benefit from buying the drug at the lower 
price and selling it when it goes up.119 However, since informal price 
fixing schemes can easily occur over dinner meetings and phone 
calls,120 the risk that a reporting requirement intended to protect 
consumers will facilitate price fixing is significantly outweighed by 
its benefits. Additionally, stockpiling is not a real issue since most 
manufacturers already negotiate distribution service agreements 
with wholesalers that recapture the value of price appreciation, 
which prevents the wholesaler from benefiting on inventory bought 
at a lower price.121 California’s transparency law may work to 
discourage price hikes because its advance notice requirement 
would signal to consumers to seek alternatives, and it would also 
signal to competitors that there may be room to enter the market.  
 Tennessee has also recently proposed legislation in response 
to drug price increases. Tennessee’s proposed legislation is known 
as the “Prescription Drug Fair Pricing Act” (“PDFPA”).122 Under 
the proposed legislation, the commissioner of health in consultation 
with TennCare123 will examine changes in prices for essential 
generic drugs in prescription drug programs operated by the state 
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Fixing Lawsuit, STAR TRIBUNE (Oct. 31, 2017) (reporting that a 
Minnesota sales person arranged meetings where company reps could 
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CHANNELS (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.drugchannels.net/2015/10/how-
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tn.gov https://www.tn.gov/tenncare/members-
applicants/eligibility/tenncare-medicaid.html (last visited on Jan. 5, 
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over the past five years.124 The commissioner shall report the finding 
of the study and any recommendations for appropriate action to 
prevent price gouging for essential generic drugs. Additionally, the 
PDFPA would require the Commissioner of Commerce and 
Insurance to examine issues relating to price transparency for 
prescription drug pricing, and to make any recommendations for 
appropriate action to implement price transparency.125 This bill 
takes a “wait and see" approach to fair drug pricing. Its key 
provisions being that drug price changes and price transparency 
issues will be looked at.  
 While the California and Maryland laws have been passed, 
several states have pending legislation addressing the same issue. 
New York has a million-dollar solution to price gouging in the drug 
market.126 If a drug manufacturer or wholesaler sells 
pharmaceuticals at an unconscionably extreme price, then it is 
subject to a one-million-dollar fine and payment of restitution to 
aggrieved consumers.127 Under New York’s proposed legislation, a 
determination of price gouging is based on a combination of the 
unconscionably extreme price and the unfair leverage or 
unconscionable means to get that price.128 Evidence must be shown 
that there is a gross disparity between the price of the drug when it 
led to legal action and the price of the drug over the six months prior, 
or that the amount charged grossly exceeded the price at which the 
pharmaceuticals were available by other consumers.129 The 
defendant may rebut a prima facie case of price gouging by 
providing evidence that costs outside the defendant’s control are 
responsible for the price increase.130 Unlike the Maryland law, New 
York’s law sets a less ambiguous benchmark with which to measure 
what an “unconscionable” price is. The law also makes a provision 
for price increases that are related to production costs. However, 
New York’s proposed legislation makes no distinction between 
brand name or generic drugs, which may cause it to run afoul of the 
Copyright Clause.131 Additionally, the penalty is so large that it may 
discourage producers from entering the market place or, 
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alternatively, encourage producers to leave, which would reduce 
competition and potentially create shortages. 
 Rhode Island takes price gouging prohibitions to a new level. 
Rhode Island’s proposed legislation makes it a felony to charge 
unreasonably excessive prices for vital drugs or pharmaceuticals in 
times of market emergency or market shortages.132 Under Rhode 
Island’s bill, “unreasonably excessive drug pricing” means there is 
a gross disparity between the amount charged and the average price 
at which the drug was available for sale within the local area in the 
course of the thirty days preceding the declaration of a market 
emergency.133 In calculating the disparity, the bill accounts for costs 
attributable to retailers, suppliers, and replacement costs imposed by 
the vendor’s source, while also excluding discounted prices offered 
as a bona fide manufacturer’s or supplier’s limited discounts or 
rebates.134 The bill’s provisions would only be applicable during a 
market emergency, which is any declaration of a state of emergency 
by the state governor or the President, or a market shortage where 
the total supply of all clinically interchangeable versions of an FDA-
regulated drug is inadequate to meet the current or projected demand 
at the user level.135 Because of its criminal penalties, this bill may 
go even further than the New York bill in reducing the number of 
market participants, thus creating an even greater risk of a shortage. 
Producers whose costs go up during a market emergency would be 
open to criminal liability should they pass those costs on to 
consumers. While the bill does take their costs into account, criminal 
penalties may dissuade producers from participating in the market.  
 Massachusetts has proposed a price transparency bill that 
would require drug companies that increase prices to provide to the 
Attorney General a justification for the increase in the wholesale 
acquisition cost of the drug.136 The bill limits the reporting 
requirement to the fifteen prescription drugs that the State spends 
significant health care dollars on and for which the acquisition cost 
has increased by fifty percent or more over the past five years or by 
fifteen percent in the past twelve months.137 Manufacturers that fail 
to provide the required information are subject to a $10,000 fine per 
violation.138 This bill is similar to California’s transparency law, but 
the reporting requirement is limited to only the drugs that cost the 
state the most money. While this may help to protect state 
expenditures, medically necessary drugs used by a small population 
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would not be required to report if their total costs were below the 
fifteen most expensive drugs overall. This bill would not address the 
most recent spate of drug price hikes because the most egregious 
price spikes occurred in small market drugs. 
 The states mentioned above are not the only ones pursuing 
legislation, many other states have introduced legislation in an 
attempt to regulate price spikes either through price caps, reporting 
requirements, or a combination of the two.139 
 
III. WHAT LAWS SHOULD STATES ENACT TO PROTECT 
THEIR CITIZENS? 
 
 This note argues that to combat price gouging in the generic 
drug market, states should not enact price controls, but should 
instead pursue legislation that increases drug price transparency. 
Although the drug market does not work like other markets, price 
controls will most likely result in shortages of needed drugs. 
However, transparency laws with advance notice requirements for 
price increases will act as signals to consumers to begin searching 
for alternative sources of medication, and competitors will be put on 
notice that there is an opportunity to enter the market. 
 There is a strong argument for controlling prices in the drug 
market, in particular, because consumers do not have a choice to 
switch to another drug, and there is no time to wait for the market to 
correct itself through competition, as discontinuing a necessary drug 
can result in serious injury or death. Unlike markets for fuel or other 
commodities, the healthcare market has variables that cause it to act 
unlike other markets, a primary distinction being that when it comes 
to essential healthcare, there are no viable alternate markets.140 If 
gas goes up in price, consumers can reduce their consumption by 
carpooling, walking, bicycling or taking public transportation.141 
For most goods on the market, a consumer can switch to an 
alternative, or exit the market altogether. Essential medicines are 
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different because in many cases the alternative to treatment is 
suffering and death. When prices go up, patients risk serious damage 
to their health if they cut down on their treatment or decide forego 
treatment altogether. There is no real choice for the consumer. 
Additionally, medical conditions are not going to wait for 
competitors to enter the market after a price spike. In the time it 
takes for a generic manufacturer to see the price signal and decide 
to compete in that market, as well as get approval from the FDA to 
manufacture a generic equivalent and bring it to market, patients 
who are cutting down on medication or foregoing treatment entirely 
will most likely suffer adverse effects. A popular quote among 
economists is that “the market can stay irrational longer than you 
can stay solvent.”142 In the case of a newborn infant with 
toxoplasmosis, the market can stay irrational longer than the baby 
can stay asymptomatic.143  
 While the specter of a sick infant creates a sense of urgency 
to remedy the issue through sheer political will, it does not benefit 
the patient if law-makers forget that price controls have a tendency 
to limit the number of market participants by removing incentives 
to bring more supply to meet the demand. Merchants in ancient 
Rome removed their wares from the marketplace when confronted 
with Diocletian’s Edict,144 and shortages of goods following a 
hurricane are exacerbated when price gouging laws disincentivize 
people from bringing supplies to the affected area.145 While the drug 
market may act differently than other markets, fewer incentives to 
participate in the market will result in less supply. Should shortages 
occur, a patient would have no alternative other than to forego 
medication. In a realm where prices simply went up, a patient who 
could not afford medication would be able to seek financial relief 
through several avenues.146 In a world where medication is in short 
supply, a patient would be left with no cure. On balance, the patient 
is better off seeking financial assistance to secure expensive 
medication than being without medication because it is not being 
produced or sold. A state whose price-control laws discourage drug 
providers to the point that they no longer participate in the market 
ultimately drives its citizens to seek relief outside of its borders. It 
is a distinct possibility that the citizens of Maryland would be forced 
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to seek their medications elsewhere because drug producers did not 
wish to be subjected to the fees, penalties and other regulatory 
burdens imposed by the recent legislation. 
 Capping generic drug price increases may also increase the 
average price of drugs. Just as the gas price cap in Hawaii may have 
caused the price to go up to the maximum allowed, by enacting a set 
percentage increase, drug producers would then be able to raise 
prices to the maximum allowed without incurring a penalty. The 
incentive for doing so, besides increasing profits, would be to offset 
losses from not being able to increase prices as needed in the future 
without incurring regulatory scrutiny. While the GAO found that the 
average cost of generic drugs was declining despite the price spikes, 
a set price increase cap may cause the prices of those drugs to rise. 
While small market patients would have some price protections, an 
overall increase in prices would have a detrimental effect on insurers 
and government programs.  
 Laws that increase drug price transparency and require 
advance notice of price hikes are a good way to keep generic drug 
prices down. Unlike most markets where the price of a commodity 
is readily available to buyers and sellers, the true cost of 
pharmaceuticals is obscured by a web of rebates and discounts 
between pharmacy benefit managers, manufacturers, and insurance 
companies.147 Because of a lack of information, buyers do not 
always know how much they are truly paying, and other producers 
do not know when prices are appropriate to manufacture a 
competing generic drug. By requiring drug companies to give the 
state sufficient prior notice of a price hike, as well as the detailed 
reasons therefor, the state can publish that information to signal 
competitors. This could lower prices by either accelerating the 
entrance of market participants, or by discouraging drug 
manufacturers from raising prices exorbitantly to avoid drawing in 
more competition. Advance notice of a price hike could also signal 
to patients, physicians, and hospitals that the drug is entering a 
period of scarcity, and that they should conserve its use, find 
alternative treatments, or find alternative sources for the drug (i.e. 
compounding pharmacies).148   
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 California’s drug price transparency law sets out detailed 
reporting requirements,149 as does Massachusetts’s transparency 
bill.150 A new law regulating drug price transparency should have an 
advance notice requirement for price hikes in excess of a specific 
benchmark measure. Although California’s law is being challenged 
because its benchmark is ambiguous, Massachusetts sets its 
benchmark as the “average manufacturer price,”151 which is “[t]he 
average price paid to the manufacturer for the drug in the United 
States by—(i) wholesalers for drugs distributed to retail community 
pharmacies; and (ii) retail community pharmacies that purchase 
drugs directly from the manufacturer.”152 Having a specific 
benchmark price would help to alleviate challenges that the law is 
unconstitutionally vague. Additionally, a transparency law should 
take into account production and marketing costs so that a 
manufacturer is not unduly penalized for increasing prices because 
of increased costs. Unlike the Massachusetts law, which limits the 
reporting to the fifteen prescription drugs that the state spends the 
most money on,153 a state reporting law should apply to each drug 
that has experienced a large price increase. One of the key elements 
of the Turing business plan was to target drugs with a small patient 
population,154 and under the Massachusetts law, Turing might not 
have had to report its increases because its total costs may have been 
less than the fifteen costliest drugs, by total state expenditure. A 
transparency law should also require an explanation for the price 
increase, as well as an itemized listing of the cost of the drug’s 
ingredients, much like California’s law.155 Lastly, the state should 
publish the relevant cost information in a timely fashion in order to 
alert consumers, third-party payers, and competitors that a price hike 
is on the way. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 “Pharma Bro" Martin Shkreli infuriated the public, and that 
anger has manifested as price gouging laws that seek to implement 
price controls on pharmaceuticals. State legislatures are bound by 
the will of their constituents to do something about these egregious 
offenders. But while price controls are an emotionally satisfying 
                                                        
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/
PharmacyCompounding/ucm339764.htm (last updated June 22, 2018). 
149 Cal. S.B. 17. 
150 Mass. S.B. 627.  
151 Id. 
152 Payment for Covered Outpatient Drugs, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-
8(k)(1)(A).  
153 Mass. S.B. 627. 
154 Sudden Price Spikes supra note 16. 
155 Cal. S.B. 17. 
 BELMONT HEALTH LAW JOURNAL VOL. II 24 
way to solve the problem of high prices, they typically result in 
shortages of the items at issue. The unintended consequences of 
price controls have a long history. A better approach is to implement 
transparency laws that require advance notice of a price hike so that 
consumers can make adjustments and competitors can lay plans to 
participate in the market. While patients in financial need may have 
to seek assistance while awaiting a correction in price, in the long 
run they would be better served if states focus on ways to increase 
competition in the drug market. 
